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Political-Administrative Elites in The Netherlands: 
Profiles and Perceptions 
Wilhelmina P. Seeker* 
Abstract: The purpose of this article is a comparison of 
four Dutch political-administrative elites, i.e. Members of 
Cabinets and of the Second Chamber, high level civil 
servants and members of the Judiciary since the last half 
century. The article investigates some aspects of their 
social background, political and professional background 
and some role perceptions, in order to see whether cohesive 
behaviour is to be expected, taking common background 
characteristics as indicators. Some commonly shared 
features have been traced: a hitherto mainly masculine 
culture, (not exclusively) high social origins, similar 
occupational patterns in bureaucracy, at the bar and in 
universities. Proportionally less higher bureaucrats had 
received an academic education. Judges counted relatively 
more catholics than the other elites did. Notwithstanding 
these and other dissimilarities cohesive behaviour patterns 
can be discerned more clearly between the two political 
elites and the bureaucrats than compared to the fourth 
depicted elite, the judiciary. However, recently introduced 
new rules of external recruitment of magistrates tend to a 
growing professional and political congruence between all 
four elites. A solid basis for cohesive and cooperational 
behaviour seems at hand. 
* Address all communications to Wilhelmina P. Seeker, Faculty of Law, Department of 




Empirical investigation of the process and outcome of the recruitment of 
political elites has for a long time been considered to be one of the most 
intriguing fields of socio-political science. In most Western European countries 
studies of this kind have been carried out in the past, be it not everywhere to the 
same extent regarding time and subjects. Now again, interest in elite-studies is 
under discussion in the Context of recent developments toward European inte-
gration.1 This process of European integration is not entirely new, but since 
'Maastricht' the process seems to be accelerated at last. Cooperation in several 
fields between the political elites of the countries who decided to join the 
European Union is more than ever urgently required. In this context it is worth 
while to see to what extent similarities or dissimilarities exist between the 
different national political elites in whose hands European decision-making is 
left. 
Regarding political elites existing literature on the one hand emphasizes 
cohesion of elites (Mosca, Wright Mills, Meisel), at the other hand conflict 
(Weber). I will not review here all arguments used in the endless stream of 
articles on this very subject. Nor is it my intention to go into the question 
whether or to what extent integration is esteemed necessary, or conflict tolera-
ble, functional or dysfunctional. Suffice it to say here that I hold with the 
widely adhered theory about the decision-making process that puts strong belief 
in elite cohesion as basic condition for a successful functioning. A certain 
amount of cohesion failing, the risks of bargaining ending up in conflict are 
life-sized, whereas internal cohesion and inter-elite relationships are central to 
the achievement of aimed goals. From this view it is important to analyse the 
political elite groups in terms of convergence and cohesion. 
However, assuming that a high degree of elite congruency will advance the 
process of European cooperation and even integration, one first should 
investigate the presence or absence of this phenomenon on the national level. 
Integration in the European context is hardly to be expected to be successful 
when on the national level the elite(s) display(s) no or very low scale cohesion, 
internally or between them. This article therefore is meant to offer a 
contribution to a clearer view on the composition and some opinions of Dutch 
political elites. My purpose is to draw an outline of several national political 
elite groups on the base of some previous empirical studies and inquiries. Of 
each of these elite groups some data are presented, on: a. social background 
characteristics; b. political or professional career; c. role perceptions. 
1 This article is based on a paper presented at the annual meeting of the ECPR, april 
1994, in Madrid, workshop: National Elites and European Integration. 
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2. Outline and working method 
National elite studies in the past usually aimed primarily at an analysis of 
changes, structural, institutional and socio-cultural. Within the framework of a 
national context longitudinal studies of the composition of political elites made 
clear to what degree changes in the society were reflected in the recruitment of 
members of the political class. Not that proportional representation was ever to 
be expected to become reality, but to a certain degree developments in society 
were supposed to become visible in the (s)election of representatives of the 
people and the appointment of other prominent national leaders. 
Which elites are relevant in the context of European integration? Of the 
studies focused on positional political elites, in one way or another involved in 
the decision making process, especially members of parliament and cabinet 
ministers have been the main subject of interest, probably because these two 
elites are ranked highest between political elites at large. However, these two 
groups are not the only political actors on the national level. A third and 
eventually a fourth group should be added. As a matter of fact attention has to 
be paid to what has been called the fourth power elite: the national 
administrative elite, the senior civil servants. When it comes to influencing the 
decision making process, in national as well as European matters, this 
administrative elite should not been underestimated. Less conspiciously still 
another category within the governmental sector at large deserves more and 
more our special attention: the judiciary. Of late national judges have become 
increasingly involved in political processes. Not at least as a consequence of 
new European rules which have to be applied, judges are increasingly forced to 
test national legislation against international treaties and international law. 
In the Netherlands several systematic studies of politically involved elite 
groups have come out in the last ten years.2 Most of all members of the Second 
Chamber have been the subject of thorough investigations (Van den Berg 1981, 
1983, 1989; Daalder 1992). Not only do we have a clear picture of the 
personnel composition of this House from 1848 until now, but there are also 
several inquiries made among MPs since the 1960s. The latter offer a rich 
amount of data on perceptions of MPs on politics in general, parliamentary 
roles, other parties and so on. About the Cabinet ministers, also from 1848 on, a 
similar study on social background and career characteristics came out some 
years ago (Secker 1991). As to matters of internal cohesion among ministers 
some information is available (Andeweg 1989), but less useful in this context, 
because it is not structured the same way as the information regarding the MPs. 
The study on the civil service has a basically different character from both 
mentioned political elite studies (Van der Meer and Roborgh 1993). It deals 
with a variety of aspects regarding the administration, on both the national and 
2 See the list of references on Dutch elites. 
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local level. The main subjects are size, aspects of bureaucratization and 
representation of the civil service. Included are some data on social background 
and career, of the whole apparatus, respectively divided into three hierarchical 
echelons. Information with respect to the higher echelons could thus be 
extracted to be compared to the political elites. Finally, extensive data on the 
judiciary are available (De Groot-van Leeuwen 1991). The study on this group 
contains information on social background characteristics as well as the ideas 
of judges and public prosecutors, based on interviews from 1988-1989. 
With the help of these empirical studies on elites we are able to investigate in 
a certain way the degree of similarity of these groups. How much internal 
cohesion does exist in elite circles if one takes social, political or professional 
convergence as startingpoint? Using the available data on recruitment and, 
partly, on role perceptions of the forementioned four elites I searched for 
indicators pointing out to less or more internal cohesion and inter-elite 
connections. 
Among the factors that are generally considered contributory to elite inte-
gration are similar recruitment paths and sociometric nets. Frequently 
mentioned as an indicator for class consciousness is homogeneity in socio-
cultural backgrounds. One of the first aspects to look at in this respect is 
gender. Are elites in recent times to the same extent open to women? Previous 
research outcome has proved convincingly that social milieu is of paramount 
importance in matters of education, professional career, social skills in general 
and even possible connections in high or at least important places (Dronkers 
and Hillege 1994). In this respect attention is paid to social milieu and class, 
traditionally measured by means of the membership of nobility on the one hand 
-though the modest role of this aspect in modern Dutch society is well known-, 
by the occupational prestige of the fathers at the other hand. Education itself, 
level and discipline, of the members of the four elites is compared. The 
religious makeup of the political elites is not one of the least interesting 
characteristics in the Netherlands where -notwithstanding increasing secul-
arization- still nowadays denomination plays a certain role in appointment and 
selection procedures. 
A second group of indicators to measure potential congruence between elite 
groups could be found in the professional career, pre-elite positions, functional 
overlapping of careers, intermixed functions (of civil servants and politicians), 
the phenomenon of interlocking or interlaced elites, and also a practise of 
cross-over to other elites. Did each of the elites follow special tracks, or did 
their roads cross? It is well known from earlier studies that the careers of the 
two core political elites, cabinet ministers and parliamentarians, for a long time 
did not coincide for the greater part Until the second world war Dutch 
ministers have in majority been recruited from outside the parliament. To what 
extent the pre-political careers of both elites in recent times were intertwined? 
And how about the civil service and the judiciary? Hans Daalder long ago 
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pointed to the fact that close to one-half of (nineteenth century) Dutch MPs had 
practized in various government offices, the judiciary included. How about the 
situation in more recent times? And, as most recruitment studies deal with the 
careers of the referred elites preceding their elite position, no clear picture 
exists of the groups of bureaucrats and judges in this respect Did they remain 
loyal to their jobs or did they easily change places between them or the political 
elites? 
Within the context of the professional and political career, some aspects of 
this career itself deserve our attention. They regard the age of the incumbents at 
the moment of the first reached stage in politics; also duration and continuity, 
and -in some cases- of the information about the situation or reasons to leave 
this position. 
Apart from convergence in social backgrounds and/or careers, a third 
indicator for elite cohesiveness lies in convergence of political affiliation, role 
perceptions and mutual acceptance of roles. These factors can contribute to 
purposive and pragmatic cooperative behavior (Lijphart's accommodationism 
theory). To measure the convergence or integration of elites interviewing the 
members of the elites on matters of physical and mental, internal and inter-elite, 
communication is the most direct way. The physical side of communication 
may be expressed in terms of more or less frequent personal meetings, mental 
convergence on the basis of more or less commonly shared opinions in political 
or other professional matters. Of this kind of research some inquiries made 
among members of the political and bureaucratic elites in the 1970s and 1980s 
have been made. Of the MPs the most recent analysis, based on inquiries in 
1990, has been used too (Thomassen a.o. 1992). 
3. Social background 
Gender. Politics, government and administration have -as most public and 
private sectors in society- long been dominated by a traditionally masculine 
culture. Emancipatory movements in the Western world at least led in the first 
place to woman suffrage. In the Netherlands this was the case since 1919. One 
year before the first female MP made her entrance in parliament for the 
socialist party. In all other areas of public offices the battle to make up arrears 
in the appointment of female functionaries only had some success after the 
second world war. The first female judge was sworn in only in 1947. And the 
first female Cabinet minister - of Social Welfare - has been appointed in 1956. 
In other high-ranked public offices women have been excluded for a long time, 
not at least by the banning of married women until the 1960s. And to the 
highest category of civil servants, that of »secretaris-generaal«, the first woman 
has been appointed only in 1991, just like the first female minister, in the 
department of Social Welfare. 
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The proportion of women in higher ranked posts is uncontestedly increasing, 
but at a very slow pace. In the Second Chamber their number climbed to a nine 
percent in the 1960s. Ten years later, in the seventies, more women were 
elected, up to 13 to 16 percent Since then the number of female MPs kept 
rising to be stabilized at about 20%. Female cabinet ministers are up to now stil 
'aves rarae'. Thanks to the appointment of three women ministers in 1989, their 
percentage over the period since 1967 rose to six. The appointment of another 
four women ministers in the newly installed cabinet (august 1994) was greeted 
as big success of protagonists of female emancipation. A higher proportion of 
women, similar to that of the MPs, can be found in the judiciary. Here too one 
of five judges belongs to the female sex, but rather few women occupy the 
highest legal posts in the judiciary. In the High Court only three women have 
been appointed until now, the first one in 1967. Two years earlier the first 
female attorney-general made her appearance in this Court. In the civil service 
on the contrary the share of women in the higher echelons is still lower than in 
the other elite groups. We do not dispose of exactly comparable data, but of all 
women working in the civil service, a quarter of all employees, a mere 8 
percent belongs to the two (of six) highest function groups against 21% of their 
masculine counterparts. 
Social milieu. Of old the upper strata of society maintained a strong network, 
among other things by a policy of inter-marriages. Thus family ties remained 
for a long time an important factor also in politics. But after the emergence of 
political parties, mobilizing new strata in society, the role family connections 
played decreased. Since the turn of the century the proportion of politicians 
from prominent families rapidly declined. In Cabinet nor Parliament members 
from aristocratic families play a role of any importance. Only by chance, so it 
seems, a 'baron', 'jonkheer' or 'jonkvrouwe' is to be found in one of these two 
national political institutions. Among the members of the judiciary, however, 
stil a ten percent in the fifties was of noble origin, but in these circles also 
aristocracy disappeared almost completely in the last decades. 
In search of indications for a similar social status of the elites in modern 
times, another more indirect measuring-instrument is more useful. For all four 
elite groups at least some information is available about their social origins 
based on the occupation or occupational prestige of the fathers. In most Dutch 
elite studies an empirical prestige stratification survey of the 1950s, adapted to 
specific purposes, served as startingpoint. Occupations were divided into six 
groups, ranking from 1 (highest-ranked occupations like free professions) to 6 
(lowest-ranked, unskilled labor). Although it must be admitted that this 
stratification survey, relevant to the population at large, is less suitable for elite 
studies, it undoubtedly offers a clear view of the unrepresentative character of 
several political elites. 
In the studies on ministers and parliamentarians the same occupational 
prestige indicator has been used. Dividing the professions of the fathers into 
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three hierarchical categories, about half of both elites belonged to the highest 
social stratum.3 More deputies, nine percent, came from modest families than 
ministers, roughly three percent The last twenty five years more ministers 
came from middle and lower origins, even a ten percent came from families of 
the lowest ranked category. We do not have comparable data on family 
background of all deputies serving the last two decades, but the available data 
for the years 1968 and 1990 do not show significant changes. Still half of the 
deputies have fathers belonging to the highest strata; the percentage of lower 
origin deputies has slightly risen to 12 in 1990.4 
For comparative goals the ranking system has to be adapted. Professions in the civil 
service, the judiciary and other free professions are ranked very higly in the Nether-
lands, whereas in many countries these are considered typical middle class occupati-
ons. 
4 It is noteworth that in the prewar decades the number of deputies from middle and 
lower ranking milieus had increased mainly as a consequence of the entrance in 
parliament of members from the three major ideological subcultures: Catholics, 
Calvinists and Socialists. After the war inter-party differences in milieu according to 
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The processing of data on the occupational background of the judges has 
been done more or less in a similar way. Of this elite an even higher part had 
fathers with high ranked occupations in 1970, 60%. But in 1988/89 this 
percentage decreased to 51%, similar to the share of MPs in this category. In 
both years only 8% of the judges was of modest origin. Information about 
occupational prestige of fathers of the senior civil servants has been processed 
differently and can not satisfactorily be compared. Especially the categories 
new and old middle classes are hard to translate in terms of high or middle 
strata. The parental occupations were classified according to four categories. 
The proportion of working class fathers has considerably increased: from 6% in 
the 1950s to more than twice as much, 15% in 1988, though this still does not 
reflect at all the occupational population at large. 
Education. Based on the data on the social background of the elites in terms of 
the occupational prestige of their fathers, thus the image looms of elite groups 
with mainly a middle or upper class character, with very few exceptions of 
members coming from the lower classes. Affirmation of this impression of not 
strictly closed, but still rather exclusive groups is to be found in data on the 
educational background. 
The judiciary is most exclusive in this respect; an academic degree in law is 
just the basic condition to start a legal career and has to be followed by a 
professional education of several years. Such conditions are not posed for the 
bureaucratic and political elites. But there too academic training seems to 
become increasingly a prerequisite. Ministers rank almost as high as the judges 
as to educational criteria. Only very few cabinet members have reached their 
high political post starting from a rather modest educational background. 
In modern Dutch »merit«-society it is almost a miracle if one reaches the 
political top without previous formal tertiary schooling. In this respect fairly 
big discrepancies exist between ministers and MPs, although of the latter over 
fifty percent had an academic degree. But with over 40% of MPs with an 
non-university, intermediate education they resemble more the group of the 
senior civil servants. In this group apparently a higher proportion has reached 
the bureaucratic toplevel by other than educational means. 5 
Among the university graduates an education in law has been paramount 
from the beginning until these days. Apart from all members of the judiciary 
elite group more than half of the academics among the ministers (63%) and the 
MPs (57%), active in the two first postwar decades, had a law degree. This 
percentage declined since the 1960s to 34 for the ministers. For the MPs the 
this measure practically disappeared, with only the liberals showing a continuing 
slight preponderance of higher milieus among the members. 
Van der Meer and Roborgh (1993) handle various dividing lines between civil 
servants. In general when speaking of higher civil servants, they indicate those ranked 
in salary-scale 10 and higher. The real 'senior' civil servants are found from level 12 
on. This highest category counted 80% academics in 1988. 
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percentages were 49 in 1968, 35 in 1990. Their places were increasingly taken 
by persons with a degree in economical or political sciences. About a fifth of 
the university educated members of cabinets in the period 1946 to 1967 had 
received an economic training and almost a quarter of those serving in the last 
25 years. In parliament too more economists appeared, 17% of the 
academically trained before the sixties, to a stabilized percentage of about 20 in 
the eighties. The phenomenon of politicians from political science background 
is typical for the last twenty years. One of six ministers and one of ten MPs 
from such a background since the sixties made their appearance in politics. 
Among all academic civil servants also more than half had the masters 
degree in law in 1947. Here the decrease of law was higher than in the other 
elite groups: in 1988 only 27% of the academically trained had studied law. 
The growing importance of economics in modern states is illustrated by the 
enormous increase of economically trained civil servants. From a mere nine 
percent of academics in the administration shortly after the war, the percentage 
of economists increased to 35 in 19886 
Religion. The Dutch political scene is known for its historical rooted division 
along religious lines. Strong ties between political party and denomination do 
not exist in all parties. However, for politicians at least, even after deconfessio-
nalization in the 1960s, recruitment along religious lines has partly been 
maintained by some of the political parties. The process of deconfessio-
nalization of the electorate was prominently made clear in the decreasing 
number of votes for confessionally based parties. Since the elections of 1967 
6 See about the increasing role of economists in government in the period 1945-1975: 
M.L. Bemelmans-Videc (1984), Economen in overheidsdienst, (Ph.D. diss., 
Rotterdam). 
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the traditionally big three confessional parties lost definitely the majority they 
had kept over fifty years. 
Rather big differences are made visible in the religious background of the 
elites. However, developments in this respect occurred over time. No 
outstanding differences in religious background between parliamentarians and 
ministers were there until the seventies. Also in times of increasing 
deconfessionalisation both elites resemble each other in a same tendancy of 
decreasing recruitment of catholics. They differ however as to the share of 
Dutch reformed and not religious members. More alterations in religion show 
the higher civil servants. The frequently mentioned disproportional low share 
of catholics in high public posts was reality in 1951 and has become even 
worse in 1988. Remarkably the percentage of catholics among civil servants 
decreases with the level. On the highest levels one of five civil servants was 
catholic in 1988, on the lowest level (not in Table 3) one of three, and on the 
intermediate level one of four. The number of 'gereformeerde', orthodox-
protestant civil servants on the contrary, increases the higher the hierarchical 
positions: from 7% for the lower ranks up to 11 in the higher echelons. And the 
same applies, to an even higher rate, to the category of administrators without 
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religion: from 42 percent among the lower ranked to 50 percent at the top. 
After considerable changes in religious background of higher civil servants 
they now resemble most the MPs. 
Obviously catholics are well represented among the members of the 
judiciary. In 1988 their share was much higher than in the political or 
administrative elites. While in the political elites since the introduction of 
universal suffrage recruitment on religious criteria roughly spoken went along 
partylines, this was quite different regarding nominations for the High Court. 
Until the 1960s the religious background was de facto considered one of the 
most important recruiting criteria, however, not in proportional terms. 
Especially the number of catholics was strictly controlled. During the first 
postwar years up to the sixties the number of catholic councillers deliberatedly 
never rose above four. Only when a catholic counciller resigned another co-
religionist was appointed in his place. A fifth catholic counciller joined the 
Court in 1960. Since the seventies, however, no consequent policy in this 
respect can be recognized. 
4. Careers 
Pre-elite career patterns. Recruitment systems obviously are connected to 
demands made on the elites in question. It goes without saying that knowledge 
from education and expertise from previous functions belong to the most 
decisive factors in the recruitment process. For all four elites I tried to collect 
comparable information as to the previous careers, assuming to find at least 
some overlapping in the distinguished pre-elite careers since all four focuse on 
government and politics. 
Of the administrative elite detailed information about the occupational past is 
lacking. The impression the study of Van der Meer and Roborgh left, is that 
bureaucracy increasingly has got a closed character. In 1950 roughly half of the 
senior civil servants had previous occupational experience elsewhere, against 
one-third in 1988. Especially the toplevel bureaucrats have started their career 
in the civil service immediately after the end of educational training, or are 
recruited internally. 
With the exception of the administrative elite I divided the other three elites 
according to previous experience in six main occupational groups. For both 
political elites I registrated the occupational background twice. For MPs and 
ministers firstly the occupation they had at the moment of entering Parliament 
or Cabinet for the first time (Table 4); secondly a division of first occupational 
experience (MPs) or at any moment in the past (ministers) (Table 5). 
Of the four elites the judiciary takes a exclusive position with a respect to 
special requirements. Naturally the starting point for a career is formed by 
university law training. Unlike the situation in other countries the Dutch 
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judiciary has a mixed recruitment system in terms of the occupational 
background of magistrates before entering. Of the generally known two inflow-
routes, one by internal training, the other by the recruitment of external 
juridically experienced candidates, both exist and are equally applied. In the 
1950s internally recruited magistrates dominated strongly. However, also those 
who followed the internal training have got some external experience by means 
of a two-years stay outdoors. From the externally recruited on the other hand at 
least 6 years of experience in the legal profession is required. 
Within the judiciary different career patterns can be distinguished for the 
judges on the one hand, the public prosecutors at the other hand. Magistrates of 
the latter category used to be recruited much more often by internal ways than 
the sitting magistrates. Official policy now is to recruit fifty percent of the 
personnel internally, fifty percent externally. Of all magistrates in 1951 more 
than half, 54%, had been active somehow outside the strict judiciary field. In 
1974 this number had risen to 73 percent and still higher in 1986, to 78. 
Practising as lawyer continued to be most often the external legal experience. 
This declined over the years. In 1974 and 1986 still most outdoors experience 
of judges had been obtained in the legal profession, but quite a few judges then 
had different occupational backgrounds, in government offices, commerce and 
increasingly in universities. In 1986 more than ten percent of judges came from 
university posts, in which they approached the political elites. In short, 
magistrates now are not only recruited from outside-judiciary backgrounds to a 
larger extent than in the first postwar decades, they also show more diverse 
occupational experience. 
As to the crime de la crime of the judiciary, the members of the High Court, 
the same applies. Of those appointed after 1967 even over fifty percent came 
from outward posts. Twice as much practising lawyers and university 
professors went directly from these functions into the Court. Partly this can be 
explained by the enormous growth of both the bar and the number of 
professorships in law. To get a place in High Court one obviously has to have 
practized law in the most strict sense of the word. Previous experience in 
governmental circles, even of the highest quality, does in itself not meet with 
the high requirements of Court. Obviously members of the judiciary nowadays 
have more connections with society at large than in earlier days. But on the 
other hand the phenomenon of members of the judiciary who for years 
occupied a seat in Parliament or were active in other, local, political functions 
(between 1848 and 1888 this was true for over 30% of the judges), was not to 
be seen again in the postwar time. 
For both political elites in The Hague the occupational experience before the 
political career looks somewhat different. What strikes the eye is the number of 
MPs that came from organizations of all kinds (political, socio-economical). In 
the last decades this proportion has declined with almost 50%, but still regards 
one fifth of all MPs. Both ministers and MPs continued Dutch tradition in 
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maintaining close linkages with government offices, in recent years still not 
less than one-third of both elites. It is evident that the number of MPs recruited 
from governmental circles has risen considerably in recent times, whereas the 
declining number of ministers from similar backgrounds is caused by 
recruitment immediately from the parliament. Ministers and MPs shared -with 
the judiciary, and to the same extent- affiliation with the educational field. Not 
many politicians in recent years came from strict judicial occupations. 
However, if we look at the whole previous occupational career of the ministers 
the picture changes in this respect. One of four ministers in the years 
1946-1967 ever had practised as lawyer. Government however has kept by all 
means an outstanding importance as recruiting channel for ministerial 
candidates. 
Age, duration, continuity in elite positions. The extent of crossing over from 
one to another elite depends among other things on the age of entrance in one 
of the elite-positions and also on the time spent in this place. At the very first 
entrance in the judiciary the mean age of the magistrates of 1986 was 41 as to 
the sitting magistracy, 36 to the standing magistrates. This difference in age of 
five years between judges and public prosecutors has continually been there. 
Those who were recruited internally started their judicial career much younger, 
at 36, than those who first occupied other functions in society. The latter 
category entered the judiciary at 43. In all ranks of judicial positions the mean 
age of the groups was lowering in recent years, but this was caused less by the 
entrance of younger persons than by the appointment of a large number of 
newcomers. The mean age of magistratres declined from 52 in 1951 to 48.5 in 
1986. Very few judges or public prosecutors leave the judiciary. The majority 
remains loyal to their profession. Cross-over from the judiciary to politics or 
other sectors in society hardly ever occurs any more. Nowadays members of 
the judiciary only exceptionally are politically active, as senator or in local 
councils.7 
In broad outlines bureaucracy shows an even more closed structure than the 
judiciary. A majority of civil servants - of all levels - starts directly after 
education. It does not surprise that the mean age of higher civil servants is 
higher than for the other echelons. More than half of the higher administrators 
is older than 40 years and less than 10 percent is under 30. Direct recruitment to 
the toplevel from outside the service is of minor significance. 
About MPs and ministers more detailed data about age are available. This is 
the more interesting because members of these two elites changed places more 
frequently than the administrative or judicial elites. Mean age in the Second 
House has been lowering since 1946, especially since the sixties; after the 
1963-election mean age did no longer rise above 50. Apparently the lowering 
of the minimum age in 1963 to 25 years greatly contributed to reach this mean 
7 In 1986 one of the justices of the High Court held a function in the scientific institute 
of one of the political parties (CDA). 
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lower age of the members, but part of the explanation is also to be found in the 
introduction of a »retirement« age for MPs. Most parties no longer nominated 
candidates older than 60 years. The duration of the average mandate being 
about two four-year terms, it becomes clear that most MPs who can not or do 
not wish to return to their previous jobs look forward to other challenging 
posts. Membership of a cabinet of course is attractive to many MPs. And we 
saw that especially since the sixties more and more MPs entered cabinets. 
Of the MPs in the period 1946-1967 who did not return in Parliament nearly 
two-thirds returned to their old or went to new jobs, one of three retired 
because of age or health problems. Ten percent died still in office or soon after 
retiring. The lowering of the mean age of MPs during the last 25 years had its 
consequences with regard to the post-parliamentary career. The overwhelming 
majority continued a professional career after leaving parliament To only ten 
percent age or bad health meant not only the end of the parliamentary mandate, 
but of their whole professional career. 
Overlap and cross-over of elites. The political career of MPs but also of 
ministers is of another nature than the professional careers in the judiciary or in 
the civil service. To begin with, the election mechanism that leads to a 
membership of the Second Chamber is not at all comparable to procedures to 
enter the administrative or judicial elites. Differences in recruiting paths are 
reflected in the career itself. Membership of parliament can be combined with 
continuation of another profession, but can also be interrupted voluntarily or 
unvoluntarily through absence of the electorates support. Till the end of the 
sixties a majority of Dutch MPs did not quit the profession they practised at the 
moment of election. Incumbents of public offices and civil servants in general 
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who enter parliament have to give up their jobs for the time of their 
parliamentary mandate, but keep the right to return. Changing places between 
bureaucracy and Parliament meets with fewer difficulties than in any other 
occupational sector. To be appointed as Cabinet minister on the contrary means 
the end of earlier offices. 
Regarding three of the four elites some information has already been given 
about previous occupational, experience. Did the elite come from at least partly 
convergent occupational backgrounds? Were their paths to the elite positions 
strictly separated? In the judicial career with its own stipulated conditions of an 
academic education in law plus some years of internal training we saw a 
growing recruitment of members of the judiciary from external occupational 
background during the last decades. Here a connection can be found with the 
administrative elite. We do not have information on the types of the previous 
occupational career of civil servants who were recruited externally. We do 
know however from which sectors externally recruited magistrates came: the 
free professions, i.e. the bar, governmental offices and the educational sector 
(universities). Richer information is at our disposal with respect to the pre-
political careers of MPs and ministers, as illustrated earlier. Although the data 
do not allow to enter into details the conclusion so far might be that a 
considerable part of the elites has a common occupational past: in government, 
as lawyer, and in universities. Negatively spoken do all of them share one other 
point: very few of the political-administrative-judicial elites come from 
economic occupations in commerce, business or the like. 
Little has been said so far about the cross-over from one elite position into 
another and vice-versa. To map data of this kind we need more information of 
post elite positions. We do have some data of that kind regarding the ministerial 
elite since World War II. These have partly been processed in a comparative 
context (Blondel 1991). As to the cross-over to one of the other three elites the 
following can be said. Of all ministers 16% was over 60 when leaving Cabinet 
One-third of all leavers returned to parliament, among them a few of the over-
60 years old. But we know from previous research that the duration of most 
ex-ministers in parliament was rather short (Secker 1989). In quite a few cases 
post-ministerial parliamentary periods were regarded as waiting periods to look 
for another interesting job. Information of the continuated post-ministerial 
careers in the course of the time is insufficiently available. Of most of the 
outgoing ministers we only know the occupational situation shortly after their 
leaving the Cabinet. One Of five ministers returned to previous occupations, 
while over forty percent entered new jobs, in private business, public enterprise 
or in international posts. Blondel did not go into the nature of these previous or 
other jobs. Certainly not many of the ministers came from and returned to the 
judiciary.8 However, ministers who returned to or accepted an appointment in 
8 One of the exceptions was 
1981. 
J. de Ruiter, minister of Justice in 1977, of Defence in 
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the public sector for the first time, are no exceptions at all. Many a minister or 
parliamentarian can be found in offices such as burgomaster or commissioner 
of the Queen after retirement from politics. 
Earlier the increasing recruitment of ministers from the parliamentary 
channels has been mentioned. Since the 1960s more than half of the new 
ministers are recruited from one of the Houses of Parliament. The patterns of 
cross-over between parliament and cabinet in the years 1946-1989 can be 
sketched as follows. About as many ministers in the postwar period reached 
their Cabinet post from a parliamentary seat as the number of ministers who 
came from other occupational background, respectively 71 parliamentarians 
and 74 non-parliamentarians. Roughly a same number of ex-ministers, 72, took 
a seat in one of the Houses of Parliament after leaving the cabinet, against 73 
ex-ministers who did not enter or return to Parliament. This miraculous 
equilibrium was not brought about exclusively by the return of ex-
parliamentarians reoccupying their old seats. One-third of ex-ministers made 
their entrance in Parliament as parliamentary 'freshmen'. 
Most frequently interlacing of elite-positions occurred between membership 
of parliament and the governmental sector. This phenomenon is not new in the 
Netherlands. Of old politicians were recruited from »regenten« circles, from the 
established governmental families. The proportion of MPs recruited from 
administrative posts was much higher in 1990 than in the sixties, one of three 
against one of four. Without more information of the destination after leaving 
the parliament nothing can be said about increasing or declining cross-over 
afterwards.9 
9 A recent publication about resigning parliamentarians dealt primarily with the reasons 
of MPs to leave, but did unfortunelately not pay any attention to the categories of new 
jobs, the ex-MPs went to (De Vos, 1990). 
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5. Political affiliation and role perceptions 
Distribution of political forces: Ministers and MPs. One of the outstanding 
significant features regarding the incumbents of the four elites is political 
affiliation. Of the core groups, parliamentarians and also ministers, this is 
directly connected with political relative strenght of the electorate. Cabinets, in 
the Netherlands since long composed of more parties, supported by a majority 
of the MPs, do not always reflect clearly political strenght. For a long time until 
the recent formation of the Cabinet-Kok, august 1994, confessional parties have 
continuously participated, the catholic party -KVP- without interruption, the 
two protestant parties ARP and CHU together or alternately. After the three 
parties at the end of the seventies merged into one new party -Christen 
Democratic Appeal (CDA) this party until now always shared responsibility in 
government. Participation of liberals or social-democrats determined the 
center-rightish or -leftish character of the government with now and then other 
smaller parties taking part in government too. 
The first years after the war cooperation of the two biggest parties, KVP and 
PvdA formed the core of many a cabinet Since both parties separated in 1958 
center-right cabinets became standard. Social-democrats only participated in 
1965 (one year only), from 1973 to 1977, six monthes in 1981-1982, and since 
1989. 
In the first postwar cabinets some ministers participated without being a 
member of one of the political parties. This was one of the remnants of the past 
when the majority of the ministers was not only not recruited from parliament 
but was a homo novus in politicis in the broadest sense of the word. Especially 
heads of the departments of Defense, Foreign or Colonial Affairs used to be 
non-political technocrats, recruited from related sectors in society. Of course 
since parliamentary democracy was firmly rooted and political parties well 
established, this phenomenon became exceptional. The last non-party minister 
was the head of Foreign Affairs in 1952. Of the 68 persons who have been 
member of one or more cabinets from 1946 to 1967 24 were affiliated to the 
KVP, 14 PvdA, 10 and 9 to the two protestant parties CHU and ARP, and 7 
were members of the liberal W D . Since then until 1994 89 new persons have 
been incumbents of the ministerial office. Half of this number belonged to the 
three denominational based parties which in 1980 were integrated in the new 
CDA. Twenty were liberals, sixteen social-democrats, whereas three new 
parties counted ten ministers. 
Political preferences of civil servants and magistrates. In 1988 the Dutch prime 
minister stated that concerning recruitment of the toplevel bureaucrats quality 
came first and political affiliation played no role at all. His statement came after 
some rumours regarding the supposed privileged position of the Christian-
democratic party in this respect. From the 13 highest-ranked civil servants nine 
belonged to the CDA. This situation, some critics argued, was contrary to 
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principles of desirable neutrality of the civil service. Is neutrality in this sense 
an illusion indeed? The recent investigation into the whole civil service has led 
to information about political preferences of all civil servants, also of the higher 
level. Among the governmental officals, all levels included, strongest support is 
for the Labour Party, the PvdA, with 32%. Sympathy for the Christian-
democratic party exists among 28% of the civil servants. The rightwing liberal 
party WD finds 18% of the civil servants among her adherents, the leftwing 
liberal D66 13%. On the whole political preferences of the civil service differ 
considerably of the electorate in 1989: less sympathy for the CDA, somewhat 
more for the W D , but twice as much for the leftwing liberals. 
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More discrepancies between civil servants and electorate become visible, 
when the higher categories of officials are taken apart. Among the highest-
ranked bureaucrats the PvdA looses much support, is the CDA represented 
proportionnally and are the liberals, righand leftwing, strongly 
overrepesented.10 There is no question of a dominant position of conservatism 
in the civil service as such. But among top level civil servants there is an 
unmistakable inclination toward center-rightism. 
As was the case with respect to the civil service, the political signature of the 
magistrates long time was a well kept secret. Just like the presumed neutrality 
of bureaucracy, judicial independence is supposed to be incompatible with 
political preferences. It is therefore not surprising that hardly any information 
of this nature was available until the inquiries held in 1986. From these 
inquiries it was made clear that the political affiliation of the magistrates 
deviates considerably from that of the whole population and consequently, of 
the MPs. The adhesion of one-third of the judiciary to Christian-democratic 
parties (included some 'splinters') does not deviate too much of the correspon-
ding proportion of seats in the Second Chamber which the 1986-elections had 
brought to candidates of christian parties. Of the judiciary sample another third 
voted Conservative, i.e. liberal, and one-fifth Labour. This affiliation deviates 
rather strongly from strenght of the respective parties in the House, where 
liberals (conservatives) did not even occupy one-fifth of the seats and the 
social-democrats in those days about one-third. Among the judges the political 
The picture changes if one distinguishes between the ministries. Officials with leftish 
sympathies are more frequently to be found at the ministries of Social Affairs, Social 
Welfare, Housing and Economical Affairs, rarely at Defence. The christian-
democratic CDA is underrepresentated at almost all ministries, excepted at 
Agriculture and Defence. The Liberals are representated best, even overrepresentated 
at Finance, Traffic and Defence, whereas the left-liberal D66 is successful in all 
ministries. 
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inclination is rather center-rightish than center-left When asked for, the 
magistrates themselves declared to be in favour of a political mixture of the 
judiciary, but excluding the extremes. The legal system, in their opinion, does 
not allow for too strong tensions between extremist personal opinions. 
Role perceptions of MPs and bureaucrats. From a research project on elite 
integration regarding Dutch MPs and senior civil servants, carried out twenty 
years ago, no basic cleavages were discovered between the two elites. 1 1 Both 
elites agreed in a remarkably high degree as to its own and the other's roles. 
Both placed the policymaking role at the highest priority. As a matter of course 
views were expressed in the interviews that emphasized different aspects of 
elite roles. Sometimes the separation of the roles of bureaucracy and politicians 
got more attention, in other interviews the spokesmen suggested that such roles 
were mixed or overlapping. The senior civil servants seemed to have taken on 
roles that were positively linked to the policy process, changing these roles as 
polity and society were changing. The neutral executor role scored rather 
highly. The majority of the civil servants thought themselves loyal supporters 
of their minister irrespective of his party. The researcher's conclusion was that 
Dutch senior civil servants tend to be non-Weberian in their total perspectives. 
Notwithstanding different emphases, by and large the role perception of the 
bureaucrat as involved in policymaking seemed to prevail. And it is the latter, 
in which, according to Eldersveld c.s., MPs for the most part concur. The MPs 
seemed especially aware of their different roles, as public representatives, 
communicators with the masses, supporters of interest and causes, and servants 
of constituents. However, they were preoccupied most with representative and 
policymaking roles, with special expertise as a good third role or quality. 
Convincing relationship between background variables such as age, number of 
years in the service and role orientations was not found. Factors of at least 
some relevance are university training and party preference. 
Most interesting were the perceptions of MPs and bureaucrats regarding 
actual influence among elites. Both groups agreed on the overwhelming 
importance of MP-specialists and ministers. On most other actors, such as trade 
unions, parties, newspapers, action groups they disagreed more or less. Their 
mutual perceptions of the role of the civil servants showed »some evidence of 
basic disagreement, but no real extremeness in their positions«. MPs saw civil 
servants as more influential than this elite did itself. 
One of the major observations which Eldersveld derived from his research in 
1973 was that »to speak of consensus or congruence, and dissensus or distance, 
between Parliament and the bureaucracy is a gross oversimplification* 
(Eldersveld 1981: 218). It is better instead to underline the heterogeneity of 
both elite groups. At the same time however it would be a wrong impression to 
11 Eldersveld a.o. (1981), especially Chapter 4: Role Perceptions of Bureaucrats and 
M.P.'s. Next section is entirely borrowed from this book. 
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as their male colleagues. However, several tokens indicate a growing 
acceptance of and a slow development toward a proportionally more reasonable 
appointment policy in this respect. High social origins constitute the second 
factor which contributed largely to reach the depicted elite-positions, but in a 
less degree. None of the elites is closed. However, in all four groups 
incumbents from lower social strata remained only a minority. From a 
comparative perspective of the four elites bureaucracy showed up to be the 
most, judiciary the lest open to 'social climbers'. The latter elite also deviated 
somewhat from the other three in religious composition. More catholics have 
been appointed in the judiciary than in the other elite-positions. With the 
exception of the higher civil servants the majority is university trained; this has 
not been changed since Eldersveld described, based on his investigations in the 
1970s, university education as the key credential for getting into one of the elite 
positions. The judiciary excluded, a same development among the academics 
among the elites is visible: from an overwhelming majority of law-trained to a 
growing influx of specialists sharing an academic background in economics or 
political science. 
Eldersveld suggested adult socialization experiences after university to be 
more influential than any other mentioned social background aspect. Among 
the contributory factors he counted the type of party for MPs, the type of 
ministry for the bureaucrat, and the associations and interactions which their 
position and roles in these contexts led to. We do not have comparable evidence 
of this kind, but from the career patters one may conclude that a considerable 
proportion of the elites shared similar occupational patterns: in bureaucracy, at 
the bar, and in universities. Or, in the negative, very few members of the elites 
came from the large sector of commerce and industry and the like. Very few 
magistrates seem to be tempted to leave the judiciary and cross over to the 
political or administrative elites. By contrast quite a number of higher-ranked 
civil servants choose to continue - for a shorter or longer period - their 
professional career in other surroundings, to a certain degree in the judiciary, 
more explicitly in political institutes. 
With a view to party-political affiliation of the various elites it is striking that 
the two groups who -formally- are not appointed according to political dividing 
lines, the bureaucrats and magistrates, show roughly similar political 
preferences: more center-rightish than the two strictly political elites. From a 
radically different professional perspective of neutrality judges in general hold 
politicians in rather low esteem, whereas there apparently exists strong mutual 
consensus as to role definitions and perceptions between bureaucrats and MPs. 
All mentioned aspects considered, cohesive behaviour patterns are at hand at 
least between two or three of the four elites. Regarding the fourth elite, the 
judiciary, is is true that notwithstanding mainly similar social background 
characteristics, she apparently differs most from the three other depicted elites 
as to role perceptions. At least, this holds for the sitting magistrates; their 
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standing colleagues seem to approach the higher civil servants in carrying out 
policy lines. However, the professionally based monocultural tradition of the 
judges tends to be counterbalanced through converging political sympathies on 
the one hand, by means of increased external recruitment of magistrates on the 
other hand. Similarities between the elites as to the investigated characteristics 
both the common social background characteristics, as well as professional and 
political congruence, point out to a solid basis for cohesive and cooperational 
behaviour. 
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